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Abstract
It is well-known that adding reﬂective reasoning can tremendously increase the power of a proof assistant.
In order for this theoretical increase of power to become accessible to users in practice, the proof assistant
needs to provide a great deal of infrastructure to support reﬂective reasoning. In this paper we explore the
problem of creating a practical implementation of such a support layer.
Our implementation takes a speciﬁcation of a logical theory (which is identical to how it would be speciﬁed if
we were simply going to reason within this logical theory, instead of reﬂecting it) and automatically generates
the necessary deﬁnitions, lemmas, and proofs that are needed to enable the reﬂected meta-reasoning in the
provided theory.
One of the key features of our approach is that the structure of a logic is preserved when it is reﬂected. In
particular, all variables, including meta-variables, are preserved in the reﬂected representation. This also
allows the preservation of proof automation—there is a structure-preserving one-to-one map from proof
steps in the original logic to proof step in the reﬂected logic.
To enable reasoning about terms with sequent context variables, we develop a principle for context induction,
called teleportation.
This work is fully implemented in the MetaPRL theorem prover.
Keywords: Reﬂection, Higher-Order Abstract Syntax, Meta-Theory, Type Theory, MetaPRL, NuPRL,
Languages with Bindings, Mechanized Reasoning.
1 Introduction
By reﬂection, we mean the ability to use one logic to reason about another, or
the ability to use a logic to reason about itself. At its core, a reﬂection system
has two parts. There is a representation function, written t, that deﬁnes the
representation or “quotation” of a logical formula t. Then, there is a provability
operator, written  q, which is a predicate specifying that q is a quotation of a
provable formula.
An implementation of a reﬂection system needs to have two corresponding parts:
a speciﬁc representation function, and a mechanized reﬂective reasoning (including
a deﬁnition of  · and some degree of reasoning automation)?
The issue of representation is central, and far from trivial. For example, while
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it is conceptually easy to deﬁne a representation function using a Go¨del numbering
[10], such schemes are impractical as the structure of a reﬂected term (a number)
is so diﬀerent from the original formula. Any plan to re-use mechanized reasoning
methods on reﬂected terms would be extremely diﬃcult.
The challenge is an instance of a general canonical problem—that of using mech-
anized reasoning to reason about meta-properties of systems, languages, or logics.
Our goal is to develop a canonical solution that can be used for meta-reasoning
in general. In our approach, we use reﬂection to implement a framework where
meta-reasoning is higher-order. For example, one can develop theorems of the form,
“Any system that has meta-property P also has meta-property Q,” or “Every meta-
property of system A is also a meta-property of system B.”
However, mechanized reﬂection is not easy. The general issue is that, if one
wants to talk about provability, then it seems necessary to formalize or emulate the
theorem prover and its meta-logic. This na¨ıve approach is not only diﬃcult, but
it would also require reimplementing the theorem prover within itself. Following
Barzilay [4], we aim at reusing the theorem prover instead of reimplementing it.
We present an approach to practical reﬂection as part of a logical framework,
where the representation function · is deﬁned over a logic, as well as the formulas,
inferences, and theorems that it contains. That is, to develop an account of system
L and its meta-properties, one ﬁrst deﬁnes the system L as a primitive logic, using
the exact same syntax and deﬁnition mechanism that are used in not-reﬂective case.
Then, to develop an account of the meta-properties of L, the logic is (automatically)
reﬂected en masse to L, where each theorem T in L is reﬂected as LT  in L,
and any proof of T is reﬂected to form a proof of LT . In our system, it is not
necessary to prepare for reﬂection. One may develop a theory in the usual way,
calling upon reﬂection if/when it is necessary to perform meta-reasoning.
Of course, this would still not be practical if reasoning in the reﬂected logic is
diﬃcult. The fundamental reason that our approach is practical is that the repre-
sentation function preserves structure exactly in this sense: all variables, including
both object and meta-variables, are preserved by the representation. One might
call this meta-higher-order abstract syntax. In particular, since we are working
with logics that use sequents to express their judgments, the representation func-
tion preserves sequent context variables. To do so, we develop a weak induction
principle for sequent contexts, called teleportation.
The beneﬁt of preserving the term structure is that mechanized reasoning works
transparently. That is, there is a one-to-one correspondence from proof steps in
the original logic L to proof steps in L. In fact the translation is direct and
mechanical, which means that proof automation in the original logic L also applies
in the reﬂected logic L.
This work is implemented in the MetaPRL logical framework [14, 17], and is
available at http://www.metaprl.org/. The following is a summary of the contri-
butions.
• A representation function e that preserves the structure of formula e, speciﬁ-
cally preserving object and meta-variables, and all binding structure.
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t ::= x object (ﬁrst-order) variables
| z[t1; · · · ; tn] second-order meta-variables
| Γ  t sequents
| op{b1; · · · ; bn} concrete terms
b ::= x1, . . . , xn.t bound terms
Γ ::= h1; · · · ;hn sequent contexts
h ::= X[t1; · · · ; tn] context meta-variables
1
| x : t hypothesis bindings and terms
L ::= R1;R2; · · · ;Rn a logic
R ::= t1 −→ · · · −→ tn an inference rule (ti are closed w.r.t. object variables)
Fig. 1. Syntax of formulas and logics
• A one-to-one map from proofs in L to proofs in the reﬂected logic L.
• A new induction principle, called teleportation, for induction on sequent contexts.
• A practical implementation in the MetaPRL system.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we develop the syntax
and language of logics. This then allows the formal deﬁnition of the representation
function in Section 3, as well as the deﬁnition of provability  t in Section 4. In
order to work with sequent context variables, we develop the teleportation induction
principle in Section 5. The ﬁnal step in Section 6 is to develop methods for proof
induction in reﬂected logics. We present related work in Section 7, and we conclude
with a discussion of our approach to reﬂection in Section 8.
2 Terminology
We assume we are working in a meta-language with sequents, second-order meta-
variables, and terms, as shown in Fig. 1. A term t is a formula containing variables,
concrete terms, or sequents. A concrete term op{b1; · · · ; bn} has a name op, and
some subterms b1, . . . , bn that have possible binding occurrences of variables. For
example, a term for representing the sum i + j might be deﬁned as add{.i; .j}
(normally we will omit the leading . if there are no binders, writing it as add{i; j}).
A lambda-abstraction λx.t would include a binding occurrence lambda{x.t}. Note
that here the primitive binding construct is the bound term b, and λ-binders are a
deﬁned term. An alternate choice would be to use a single primitive λ binder (for
example, as is done in LF [11]).
A sequent Γ  t includes a sequent context Γ, which is a sequence of dependent
hypotheses h1; · · · ;hm, where each hypothesis is a binding x : t or a context variable
X[t1; · · · ; tn] (x and X bind to the right). Note that sequents can be arbitrarily
nested inside other terms and are not necessarily associated with judgments.
Second-order meta-variables z[t1; · · · ; tn] and context variables X[t1; · · · ; tn] in-
clude zero-or more term arguments t1, . . . , tn. These meta-variables represent closed
1 Strictly speaking, context variables are bindings and meta-variables have context arguments in addition
to term argument. This does not aﬀect the presentation until we get to context induction (Section 5, and
we omit context arguments for now.
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substitution functions, and are implicitly universally quantiﬁed for each rule in which
they appear [19]. For example, a second-order variable z[] represents all closed terms
(we will normally omit empty bracket, writing simply z). The second-order variable
z[x] represents all terms with zero-or-more occurrences of the variable x (that is,
any term where x is the only free variable).
To illustrate, consider the “substitution lemma” that is valid in many logics. In
textbook notation, it might be written as follows, where t1[x ← s] represents the
substitution of s for x in t1.
Γ, x : t3,Δ  t1 ∈ t2 Γ,Δ  s ∈ t3
Γ,Δ  t1[x ← s] ∈ t2
In our more concrete notation, s, t1, t2, t3 are all represented with second-order
variables, and Γ,Δ with context variables. Substitutions are deﬁned using the term
arguments; rules are deﬁned using the meta-implication · −→ ·, and we consider all
meta-variables to be universally quantiﬁed in a rule. The concrete version is written
as follows (where we use s ∈ t as a pretty form for a term member{s; t}, and zi are
second-order meta-variables).
(X;x : z3;Y  z1[x] ∈ z2) −→
(X;Y  z0 ∈ z3) −→
(X;Y  z1[z0] ∈ z2)
(2.I)
In the ﬁnal sequent, the term z1[z0] speciﬁes substitution of z0 for x in z1.
Note how the term arguments are used to specify binding precisely—the variable
x is allowed to occur free in z1, but in no other term. The reason we adopt this
second-order notation is for this precision. All rule schemas representable with
substitution notation are also representable as second-order schemas, but not vice-
versa.
For the ﬁnal part, a logic L is an ordered sequence of rules. Each rule may be
an axiom, or it may be derived from the previous rules in the logic.
3 Representation of reﬂected terms
We will assume that we are working in the context of a logical framework, so there
are at least three logics in consideration—L: the object logic, M: the meta-logic in
which reasoning about the object logic is to be performed; and F: the meta-meta-
logic, or framework logic, in which the meta-logic M is deﬁned. The ﬁrst step in
the reﬂection process is to deﬁne a representation of formulas, judgments, rules and
theorems of L in terms of formulas, propositions, and sentences in M.
The representation function · produces a quoted form of its argument. As
we have mentioned previously, to preserve a one-to-one correspondence between
proofs in an original logic L and its reﬂected logic L, it is important that ·
preserve the structure of the term, including variables, meta-variables, and binding
structure. Note that the representation function itself is not a part of the language
of the logical framework; it is only a symbol of the “on-paper meta-meta-language”
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Terms
t : x ≡ x
z[t1; · · · ; tn] ≡ z[t1; · · · ; tn]
Γ  t ≡ Γt
op{b1; · · · ; bn} ≡ op{b1; · · · ; bn}
b : x1, . . . , xn.t ≡ λbx1. . . . λbxn.t
Sequent contexts
Γ : h1; · · · ;hn ≡ h1; · · · ; hn
h x : t ≡ x : t
X[t1; · · · ; tn] ≡ X[t1; · · · ; tn]
Rules and logics
L : R1; · · · ;Rn ≡ R1; · · · ; Rn
R : t1 −→ · · · −→ tn ≡ (Z  Lt1) −→ · · · −→ (Z  Ltn)
Fig. 2. The deﬁnition of the representation function
that we use for describing our implementation. Only for operators, op refers to
some concrete way of reﬂecting the operator op within the system itself [21].
The representation function is shown in Fig. 2. The parts of interest are the quo-
tations for concrete terms, sequents, and inference rules. The quoted representation
of a concrete term, op{b1; · · · ; bn}, produces a new term with a quoted name op,
and the quotation is carried out recursively on the subterms b1; · · · ; bn.
2 The
quotation of a sequent, Γ  t, is similar: the “turnstile operator” is quoted, and
the parts are quoted recursively.
The quotation of bound terms introduces a binder, written λbx.t, that represents
each binding in quoted form. 2 Note that the binding variable itself is unchanged;
the variable is preserved as a binding, but each binding is explicitly coded as a λb.
Finally, the quotation of an inference rule, t1 −→ · · · −→ tn becomes a judg-
ment about provability (Z  Lt1) −→ · · · −→ (Z  Ltn). The context
variable Z is fresh, and each sequent Z  Lti is a judgment in the meta-logic
about provability.
Informally, the reﬂected rule states that if each premise t1, . . . , tn−1 is provable in
logic L, then so is tn. A key goal is that the reﬂected rule R must be automatically
derivable from the deﬁnition of L. For clarity, when reasoning about a single logic
we will normally omit the subscript L and just write .
The choice of meta-logic is somewhat arbitrary. For our purposes, we have
chosen to use computational type theory (CTT), which is a variant of Martin-Lo¨f
intuitionistic type theory as implemented in the MetaPRL logical framework [16]. In
other words, our meta-logic Mis CTT and our framework logic F is the one provided
by MetaPRL. Note that in CTT, the reﬂected rules R are sometimes required to
2 Further discussion on quotations of names and concrete terms can be found in [21]. The encoding we
use is an essential foundation for this work, however the speciﬁc encoding details have little eﬀect on the
presentation here.
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include additional well-formedness constraints on the typing of the meta-variables.
Returning to our example, the quoted form of the substitution lemma (2.I) is as
follows, where we write s ∈ t for member{s; t}.
Z  (X;x : z3;Y  z1[x] ∈ z2) −→
Z  (X;Y  z0 ∈ z3) −→
Z  (X;Y  z1[z0] ∈ z2)
(3.I)
The operators have been quoted (in this case  and ∈), and the theorem
is now a judgment about provability stated in the meta-logic as Z   · · · . Only
the operator names have been changed, otherwise the structure, including variables
and binding, has not changed.
For an example with binding, consider the rule for universal-introduction, shown
below with the translated version. In this case, the binder x is translated to a meta-
binder with λb.⌈
X;x : z1  z2[x] −→
X  ∀x : z1.z2[x]
⌉
=
(
Z  (X;x : z1  z2[x]) −→
Z  (X  ∀{z1;λbx.z2[x]})
)
3.1 Proof reﬂection and automation
One important consequence of structure-preservation is that proofs can be reﬂected
as well. Consider a proof in the original logic L of some theorem t1 −→ · · · −→ tn.
In a foundational prover, the proof is expressed as a tree of inferences that can be
linearized to a ﬁnite sequence of rule applications R1, R2, . . . , Rn.
Since the structure of each inference is preserved, there is a corresponding
proof in the reﬂected logic L of the reﬂected theorem (Z  t1) −→ · · · −→
(Z  tn). In fact, the proof is a one-to-one map of the original theorem, us-
ing reﬂected justiﬁcations in place of the original. That is, the reﬂected proof is
R1, R2, . . . , Rn.
While this might seem quite straightforward, the important property here is that
the prover internals do not need to be reﬂected. It is not necessary to formalize the
inference mechanics of the theorem prover, because the original mechanism works
without change in the reﬂected theory.
Proof automation is similar. Again, in a foundational prover, 3 each run of a
heuristic or decision procedure is justiﬁed by a sequence of inferences R1, R2, . . ..
The existing automation may be used for reasoning in the reﬂected logic, provided
that rule selection for reﬂected proofs uses the reﬂected rules rather than the original
ones.
3.2 Syntax and reasoning
Reﬂected rules have an important property—the quoted terms are syntactical ex-
pressions, and they can be manipulated. There are constructors and destructors
3 It isn’t clear to us whether a similar mechanism might work for non-foundational provers (those with
“trusted” decision procedures).
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for quoted terms, and more importantly there is an inductively-deﬁned type that
contains all quoted terms. The speciﬁc details of the encoding have been published
previously [21]. For our current purposes it simply matters that there is a type, so
that meta-properties can be expressed.
For example, one may wish to prove a formal cut-elimination property. Using
the type Context for sequent contexts, and the type BTerm for quoted terms, a
cut-elimination theorem can be written as the following predicate.
∀X : Context.∀a, b : BTerm.(X  a) ⇒ (X,a  b) ⇒ (X  b)
In addition, we have yet to deﬁne the provability predicate  t, where it will again
be necessary to give a type to the quoted term t. Provability is the topic of the next
section.
4 Deﬁning provability
So far, we have postponed the treatment of the provability predicate L t, which
speciﬁes that the quoted formula t is provable in logic L. To deﬁne provability
properly, we take the following steps.
• First, for each rule R ∈ L, we deﬁne a proof checking predicate that speciﬁes
whether a proof step is a valid application of rule R.
• Next, we deﬁne the (legal) derivations to be the proof trees where each proof step
in the tree is validated by some rule R ∈ L.
• A formula t is provable in logic L if, and only if, there is a derivation with root t.
The usual properties hold: proof checking is decidable, provability is not decidable
in general.
4.1 Proof checking
A logic L is an ordered list of inference rules R1, . . . , Rn. A proof is a tree of
inferences, and it is legal only if each proof step corresponds to an inference using
some rule Ri. A proof step is a node in the proof tree that corresponds to a concrete
inference t1 −→ · · · −→ tn−1 −→ tn. We call the terms t1, . . . , tn−1 the premises,
and the term tn the goal.
In general, a rule R deﬁnes a schema, where each second-order meta-variable
stands for a term, and each context meta-variable stands for a context. A concrete
proof step is a valid inference of a rule R iﬀ for each second-order meta-variable
in R there is an actual term, and for each context-meta variable in R there is an
actual context, such that the concrete inference is an instance of the rule.
Let us state this more formally. The arity of a meta-variable is the number
of arguments, so a variable z[t1; · · · ; tn] has arity n. Let BTerm{i} be the type
of quoted terms of arity i, corresponding to the space of substitution functions
BTermi → BTerm. Similarly, let Context{i} be the type of contexts of arity i (the
contexts correspond to lists of quoted terms).
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Consider a rule R with free context variables {Xi11 , . . . ,X
im
m } and free second-
order variables {zj11 , . . . , z
jn
n }, where the superscripts ik and jk indicate the arities
of the variables. 4 Then a concrete inference r is a valid instance of rule R iﬀ the
following holds.
∃Xi11 : Context{i1}, . . . ,X
im
m : Context{im}.
∃zj11 : BTerm{j1}, . . . , z
jn
n : BTerm{jn}.r = R ∈ ProofStep
(4.I)
That is, the concrete inference r is equal to an instance of rule R. The type
ProofStep is the type of proof steps BTerm list × BTerm containing the pairs
(premises, goal).
For the purposes of proof checking, the existential witnesses are assembled into
a proof witness term, and passed as explicit arguments to the checker. A proof
witness is deﬁned to be an element of the Witness type, which in turn is deﬁned as
Context list× BTerm list. Returning to the example of the substitution lemma
(3.I), the corresponding proof checker is deﬁned as follows, where r is the concrete
proof step to be checked.
checks(subst lemma, r, 〈[X;Y ], [z1; z2; z3; z0]〉) ≡
r=
(
[(X;x : z3;Y  z1[x] ∈ z2); (X;Y  z0 ∈ z3)],
(X;Y  z1[z0] ∈ z2)
)
∈ ProofStep
(4.II)
In general, the “rule checker” predicate checks{R; r;w} takes three arguments,
where R is a rule, r ∈ ProofStep is a concrete inference, and w ∈ Witness is the
witness for the rule instantiation. Given a logic L with rules R1, . . . , Rn, a proof
step is valid iﬀ it is an instance of one of the rules in the logic.
checks{r;w} ≡ ∃R ∈ {R1, . . . , Rn}.checks{R; r;w}
Since proof step equality is decidable, and each logic has a ﬁnite number of rules,
the checks{r;w} predicate is decidable as well.
4.2 Derivations
Now that we have deﬁned proof step checking, the next part is to deﬁne the valid
derivations, or proof trees. The type D of all derivations is deﬁned inductively in
the usual way.
D0 ≡ void
Di+1 ≡ Σpremises : Di list.Σgoal term : BTerm{0}.Σw : Witness.
checks{(goal{premises}, goal term);w}
D ≡
⋃
i∈NDi
(4.III)
In this deﬁnition, the term goal{[d1; · · · ; dn]} is the list of goal terms for derivations
d1, . . . , dn.
4 In a setting where context variables are treated as binders, the variable arities are expressions that depend
on the lengths |Xk|.
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This deﬁnition also allows us to prove an induction principle, which will form
the basis for proof induction.
∀P.(∀premises : D list.∀g : BTerm{0}.∀w : Witness.
checks{(goal{premises}, g);w}
⇒ (∀p ∈ premises.P [p]) ⇒ P [(premises, g, w)])
⇒ (∀d : D.P [d])
At this point, the deﬁnition of the provability predicate  t is straightforward.
A quoted term t is provable iﬀ there is a derivation where t is the goal term.
 t ≡ ∃d : D.(goal{d} = t ∈ BTerm{0})
5 Sequent context induction
At this point, we now have a representation function where rules are reﬂected into
statements of provability, and in addition we have a proof-checking predicate for
establishing proof correctness. The next step is to prove that the reﬂected rules
are valid using the deﬁnition of provability. For example, consider the substitu-
tion lemma example. From the proof-checking predicate (4.II), we must prove the
reﬂected rule (3.I).
However, there is a substantial gap between the two forms. We have glossed over
the fact that the proof-checking predicates are deﬁned using standard existential
quantiﬁers (4.I, 4.III). For a quantiﬁer of the form ∃X : Context{i}. · · · the variable
X is a ﬁrst-order variable in the meta-logic MCTT. In contrast, the reﬂected rules
preserve meta-variables, and are expressed using context and second-order meta-
variables (variables of the framework logic FMetaPRL).
Second-order variables can be modeled with functions on BTerm, so the object
quantiﬁers are expressive enough to represent second-order quantiﬁcation. The
question remains, how does one derive a formula involving context variables from a
similar formula that does not? In general, sequent context variables are bindings,
sequent contexts are not terms, and they cannot be modeled directly in the object
logic.
Since the framework meta-logic we are using (the FMetaPRL meta-logic) does
not include context quantiﬁers, one option is to add them and use them in the proof-
checking predicate. However, this is undesirable in part because the framework’s
meta-logic would become extremely expressive and powerful, but also because the
extension is perilous and diﬃcult to get right.
Instead, we extend the framework’s meta-logic with a weak theory of sequent
context induction that we call teleportation. The central logical property is that
contexts are ﬁnite and inductively deﬁned. Note that this represents a strengthening
of the meta-logic by eﬀectively including Peano arithmetic.
5.1 Teleportation
The concept behind teleportation is deceptively simple. Since contexts are induc-
tively deﬁned, contexts can be “migrated,” one hypothesis at a time, from one point
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in a rule to another. Scoping must be preserved, including context variable scoping,
but beyond that the migration locations are unconstrained.
To formalize this more precisely, we introduce the notion of teleportation con-
texts, written R[[Γ]], which represents a term or a rule with exactly one occurrence
of the context Γ. We will use the symbol  to denote the empty context. These
deﬁnitions are for presentation purposes; they are not part of the meta-logic. Tele-
portation is speciﬁed using a pair of nested teleportation contexts, which we will
write as F [[·;G[[·]]]]. Here F [[Γ;G[[Δ]]]] must be a rule that has exactly one occurrence
of each of the Γ, Δ and G; in addition G must be in scope of Γ.
The simplest teleportation rule hoists the context from G to F .
(base) ∀X. F [[;G[[X]]]]
(step) ∀X,Y, z. F [[X;G[[x : z;Y [x]]]]] −→ F [[X;x : z;G[[Y [x]]]]]
∀X. F [[X;G[[]]]]
For clarity, we have written explicit universal quantiﬁers for the meta-variables
to emphasize that meta-variables are quantiﬁed for each clause/rule. Again, these
do not exist explicitly in the meta-logic, and we will omit them in the remaining
rules. As usual, it is assumed that the schema language of the teleportation contexts
would alpha-rename the bound variables as needed to avoid capture.
For generality, it is frequently useful to transform the hypotheses during migra-
tion. In the following rule f is an arbitrary function.
(base) F [[;G[[X]]]]
(step) F [[X;G[[x : f(z);Y [x]]]]] −→ F [[X;x : z;G[[Y [x]]]]]
F [[X;G[[]]]]
There is a corresponding reverse-hoisting rule.
(base) F [[X;G[[]]]]
(step) F [[X;x : f(z);G[[Y [x]]]]] −→ F [[X;G[[x : z;Y [x]]]]]
F [[;G[[X]]]]
We add the teleportation rules as new primitive rules in our framework logic
FMetaPRL. The conservativity theorem for sequent schema [19], which states that
the language of framework meta-variables is a conservative extension of the meta-
theory, can be extended to include teleportation rules. The central observation here
is that for any particular ﬁnite concrete context Γ, any proof using the teleporta-
tion rules can be transformed into a proof without teleportation by posing a ﬁnite
sequence of lemmas, one for each of the intermediate steps.
5.2 A simple example
For a fairly natural example, consider the problem of context exchange. That is,
we are given an exchange rule for hypotheses, and we wish to derive a rule for
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exchanging contexts.
X; y : z2;x : z1;Y [x; y]  z3[x; y]
X;x : z1; y : z2;Y [x; y]  z3[x; y]
=⇒
X;Z2;Z1;Y  z
X;Z1;Z2;Y  z
The proof in this case can be posed as a nested induction. To begin, we propose
to migrate Z2 left, where the • denotes the target: X; •;Z1;Z2;Y  z. The base case
follows by assumption, and the step case presents us with the following subproblem.
(X;Z3;x : z
′;Z1;Z2;Y  z) −→ (X;Z3;Z1;x : z
′;Z2;Y  z).
The proof is concluded by migrating Z1 past the hypothesis x : z
′.
5.3 Computation on sequent terms
The sequent induction scheme also introduces a sequent induction combinator for
computation over a sequent context. We introduce two new terms to the meta-logic.
The sequent ind{x, y.step[x; y]; s} performs computation over a sequent term s.
The reduction rules for sequent computation are as follows.
sequent ind{x, y.step[x; y]; ( t)} → t
sequent ind{x, y.step[x; y]; (z : t1;X[z]  t2[z])} →
step[t1;λz.sequent ind{x, y.step[x; y]; (X[z]  t2[z])}]
To illustrate, suppose we wish to develop a “vector” universal quantiﬁer. That is,
a sequent with the following deﬁnition, given that the logic has a “scalar” quantiﬁer
∀x : t1.t2[x].
x1 : t1; · · · ;xn : tn ∀ tn+1 ≡ ∀x1 : t1, . . . , xn : tn.tn+1
The deﬁnition is implemented in terms of sequent induction.
Γ ∀ t ≡ sequent ind{x, y.∀z : x.(yz); (Γ  t)}
We get the following reductions.
∀ z → z
x : z1;X[x] ∀ z2[x] → ∀x : z1.(X[x] ∀ z2[x])
The simple introduction rule can be derived directly.
Z;x : z1  (X[x] ∀ z2[x])
Z  (x : z1;X[x] ∀ z2[x])
vall-intro-single
A general introduction rule is also derivable using the teleportation rules.
Z;X  z
Z  (X ∀ z)
vall-intro
Using similar methods, it is possible to deﬁne a logic of vector operators, quantiﬁers,
and a vector lambda calculus.
Note that in these rules, the variable X is a context variable, and the rules are
valid for any instance of X.
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5.4 Sequent induction and reﬂection
With this new tool in hand, let us return to the topic of reﬂection, where the issue
was that we need to derive proofs of the reﬂected rules (with context variables) from
the proof-checking predicates (no context variables).
At this point, the plan is conceptually easy. There are two parts. First, we
develop a canonical representation of concrete sequents without context variables.
For the second part, we deﬁne a (formal) function that computes the canonical
representation from the non-canonical form that includes context variables.
The ﬁrst part is an issue of coding, where the goal is to deﬁne a representation
that preserves the structure of concrete sequents. We choose the following repre-
sentation, where λHx : t1.t2 is a quoted term that represents a hypothesis, its
binding, and the rest of the sequent; and concl{t} represents the conclusion of
the sequent. The proof-checking predicates operate directly on quoted terms with
this representation.
x1 : t1; · · · ;xn : tntn+1 ≡ λHx1 : t1. . . . λHxn : tn.concl{tn+1}
For the second part, we deﬁne a function using sequent ind that computes the
canonical representation from its non-canonical form. This function, written B, is
deﬁned as follows.
X B t ≡ sequent ind{x, y.λHz : x.(y z); (X  concl{t})}
The original reﬂected form of a rule R = (Γ1  t1) −→ · · · −→ (Γn  tn)
is R = Z  (Γ1  t1) −→ · · · −→ Z  (Γntn). Using the
non-canonical forms, the new representation is as follows.
R = (Z  (Γ1 B t1)) −→ · · · −→ (Z  (Γn B tn))
The right-hand-side is now proved by reducing the B sequents to canonical
form, then proving that the reduced form passes the proof–checking predicate for
all instances of the meta-variables. Note that contexts and context variables are
not terms, and so it remains impossible to quantify over them directly. However,
the reduced form of a non-canonical B sequent with context variables does contain
sequent subterms with context variables. With teleportation it is possible to show
that these embedded terms are well–deﬁned.
These correspondence between a reﬂected rule and its proof-checking predicate
is very close. In our implementation, the reﬂected rule and the proof checking
deﬁnitions are created mechanically, and the proof is completely automated.
6 Reﬂection and induction
So far, we have presented a structure-preserving representation function, a mech-
anism for formalizing reﬂected logics, and a procedure for deriving reﬂected prov-
ability rules. This system is already powerful enough to express and prove meta-
properties over reﬂected systems. However, it remains impractical. There is a
crucial piece missing—induction on the provability predicate.
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What exactly is the induction principle for provability? Suppose we wish to
prove a theorem of the form x ⇒ P [x], where x is a variable, and P is a predicate
on quoted terms. Since x is provable, that means there is a derivation with root x,
and we can apply induction on the length of the derivation.
Now, for illustration, assume the logic L contains three rules, L = t11, t21 −→
t22, t31 −→ t32 −→ t33. Then the induction form has the following shape.
(rule sketch)
Γ; t11  P [t11]
Γ; t21; t22;P [t21]  P [t22]
Γ; t31; t32; t33;P [t31];P [t32]  P [t33]
Γ;x  P [x]
However, this rule is not quite right. The issue is that the terms tij will in general
contain meta-variables, and the meta-variables must be separately universally quan-
tiﬁed for each induction case. As we explained in Section 5, explicit quantiﬁcation
of meta-variables is not expressible in our meta-logic.
However, here it is acceptable to use object-quantiﬁers. There is no appreciable
eﬀect on proof automation as long as the ﬁrst-order form is compatible with the
automatically–generated reﬂected rules. The correct form of the rule explicitly
quantiﬁes over the meta-variables, re-using the mechanism for generating the proof-
checking rules. For the current example, we introduce explicit quantiﬁers. In this
case we write tij[X ] to represent a term that may contain any of the variable X
but is otherwise free of context variables.
Γ;X : Context; t11[X]  P [t11[X ]]
Γ;X : Context; t21[X]; t22[X ];P [t21[X ]]  P [t22[X]]
Γ;X : Context; t31[X]; t32[X ]; t33[X];P [t31[X]];P [t32[X]]  P [t33[X]]
Γ; x  P [x]
In our implementation, we generate a variant of this rule that allows for induction
over terms, not just variables. This is done by introducing a “shared” term u that
establishes a connection provable term t and the predicate P . The actual theorem
has the form Γ;u : t1; t2[u]  P [t3[u]], where u is the shared part. The new form
is derivable from the previous case for provability on variables, and we omit it here.
In fact, the size of the rule is one of the main drawbacks. In practice, even for fairly
small logics L, the statement of the elimination rule is already several pages long,
and it is diﬃcult to use the rule interactively. We are expecting to address this in
future work.
This mechanism establishes the principle of proof induction. The principle of
structural induction is reducible to proof induction by specifying the syntax of a
language as a logic of type-checking.
For every object logic, the corresponding induction principle is not only auto-
matically formulated by our system, but is also automatically derived. Since the
proof induction principle implies soundness, this means that while we do not prove
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the soundness of our formalization in general, for each particular object logic, it will
be established automatically.
7 Related work
This work build upon a very large number of related eﬀorts. In fact, the number of
such eﬀorts is so big that we are unable to give an adequate overview in this limited
space. Harrison [12] has written an excellent survey and critique of a broad range
of approaches to reﬂection. We give another broad survey in a previous paper [21].
Our approach to representing the syntax with bindings has some similarities to
the HOAS implemented in Coq by Despeyroux and Hirschowitz [6] and to the modal
λ-calculus [9, 7, 8].
In 1931 Go¨del used reﬂection to prove his famous incompleteness theorem [10].
A modern version of the Go¨del’s approach was used by Aitken et.al. [3, 1, 2, 5]
to implement reﬂection in the NuPRL theorem prover. A large part of this eﬀort
was essentially a reimplementation of the core of the NuPRL prover inside NuPRL’s
logical theory.
A number of approaches to logical reﬂection were explored in the Coq proof assis-
tant. Rueß [23] has implemented a computation reﬂection mechanism. Hendriks [13]
formalized natural deduction for ﬁrst-order logic in the proof assistant Coq, using de
Bruijn indices for variable binding. O’Connor [22] constructively proved the Go¨del–
Rosser incompleteness theorem using the natural numbers to encode formulas and
proofs.
8 Conclusion
The goal of this work is to develop a practical theory of logical reﬂection. We
claim that doing so requires preserving the structure of a theory when it is re-
ﬂected, including variables, meta–variables, and bindings. We presented a structure-
preserving representation, building on previous work with the representation of log-
ical terms [21]. Besides, we developed a new account of sequent context induction,
called teleportation, to allow reasoning and computation over terms that include se-
quent context variables. This led to a formalization of proofs, proof–checkers, and
derivations, together with automated generation of reﬂected rules and induction
forms in the reﬂected theory.
In some ways, the result seems startlingly simple. When a logic is reﬂected, its
presentation changes only slightly, and the existing reasoning methods and proof
procedures continue to work. The diﬀerence is, of course, that reasoning about
meta-properties of the logic becomes possible.
It was important to us that the development of the theory of reﬂection be ac-
companied by its implementation. This makes it more useful of course, but an
additional reason is that the theory of reﬂection is rife with paradoxes, and it is
easy to fall into false thinking. While we have tried to simplify the account in this
paper, the actual formalization was demanding. In particular, the formalization of
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context induction required several man-months of eﬀort, mainly due to the need
to develop a logical infrastructure for reasoning about terms containing context
variables.
We are currently using reﬂection to develop an account of F<:type theory, which
has acted both as a challenge and a guide [15]. For work in the near future, we are
considering alternate ways to pose the proof induction principle. Induction is, by
nature, not modular. However, we believe that signiﬁcant practical advances can
be made through improved automation and hierarchical decomposition.
We believe that our results may be generalized to other provers and frameworks.
The non-standard properties of the logical framework that we rely upon are the fol-
lowing. 1) Programs may be expressed without ﬁrst giving them a type; in addition,
programs may have more than one type. 2) Computation deﬁnes a congruence; any
two programs that are computationally (beta) equivalent can be interchanged in
any formal context. 3) For reasoning about sequents, the teleportation principle is
needed. 4) A function image type [20].
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